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ABSTRACT
We examine whether equity volatility can explain the difference in syndicated corpo-
rate loan spreads paid by U.S. and European borrowers first documented by Carey and
Nini (2007). We argue that OLS estimates of the association between equity volatility
and loan spreads are biased and inconsistent. We suggest instrumental variables that
potentially identify consistent estimates. Our instrumental variable results indicate
that there is no statistically significant difference in loan spreads paid by U.S. and
European borrowers, and that OLS estimates of the association between idiosyncratic
equity volatility and corporate loan spreads are biased downward by about a factor of
5.
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In this paper we examine whether equity volatility can explain the difference in syndicated
corporate loan spreads between the U.S. and Europe documented by previous research. Carey
and Nini (2007) provide evidence that interest rates spreads in Europe are 30 basis points
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lower than in the United States, and Houston, Itzkowitz, and Naranjo (2007) present evidence
that loan spreads are 40 basis points lower in Europe compared to the U.S. These authors’
results suggest that there must be a barrier that prohibits U.S. borrowers from accessing
the lower cost European loan market. This is puzzling because several large lenders extend
credit to both markets, and many large borrowers have global operations in both continents.
Intuition suggests that many of these firms could easily access either market.
While these studies control for numerous control variables from the literature that ex-
amines the determinants of cost of corporate loan and bond financing, they do not directly
control for firm volatility. It is well established in the finance and economics literature that
firm volatility is a primary determinant of the cost of corporate debt financing and that
equity volatility is a proxy for firm volatility. Beginning with Merton (1974), contingent
claims models of corporate debt valuation predict that cost of debt financing is a function of
firm’s total debt, asset value, and asset value volatility. These models also predict that eq-
uity volatility is a direct function of firm’s asset volatility, which motivates the use of equity
volatility as a proxy for firm’s asset volatility. Empirical evidence confirms the predictions of
these models. Campbell and Taksler (2003) present evidence equity volatility has substan-
tial explanatory for corporate bond yields, and that idiosyncratic volatility can explain as
much cross section variation in bond yields as credit ratings. In addition, Santos (2011) and
Santos and Winton (2010) find that equity volatility to have significant explanatory power
for syndicated loan spreads in the U.S. market.
Although equity volatility has been shown to have significant explanatory power for loan
spreads, we cannot expect it to explain the difference in U.S. and European loan spreads
unless there is a large difference in average equity volatility between U.S. and European
firms. Recent research suggests that there is. Bartram, Brown, and Stulz (2009) present
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evidence idiosyncratic equity volatility is larger in the U.S. compared to other countries,
however they find mixed evidence regarding the relative magnitudes of systematic equity
volatility. They suggest that idiosyncratic volatility is greater in countries with greater
government stability and quality, and financial development, and that greater idiosyncratic
equity volatility reflects greater risk taking rather than informed trading. In Figures (1) and
Figure 1: All-In-Drawn Spread and Idiosyncratic Volatility
(2), we plot average loan spreads along with estimates of borrower’s average idiosyncratic and
systematic equity volatility for U.S. and European borrowers in the Dealscan database over
the years 1990-2010. Figure (1) shows that U.S. firms have greater average idiosyncratic
volatility as compared to European firms for most of the data sample and that gap has
narrowed over time. In addition, average idiosyncratic volatility appears to follow a similar
cyclical pattern for both U.S. and European firms. This is consistent with the analysis of
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Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2012) who find that average idiosyncratic volatility is highly
correlated across countries. In addition, the difference in average idiosyncratic volatility is
mimicked by greater average loan spreads in the U.S. as compared to Europe. Also the gap
in loan spreads narrows toward the end of the data sample. Furthermore, loan spreads for
both sets of borrowers appear to follow patterns similar to idiosyncratic equity volatility.
In Figure (2) the plots indicate that there is no significant pattern in the difference in
average systematic volatility between U.S. and European firms. Average systematic volatility
appears to follow similar trends in both the U.S. and Europe. Our graphs are consistent
with the results of Bartram et al. (2009), and provide support for the claim that differences
in idiosyncratic volatility between U.S. and European borrowers could potentially explain
loan pricing puzzle.
Figure 2: All-In-Drawn Spread and Systematic Volatility
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We use a large sample of corporate loans to examine whether equity volatility, decom-
posed into its idiosyncratic and systematic components, can explain the loan spread differ-
ential paid by U.S. and European borrowers. We decompose borrowers’ total stock return
volatility into its idiosyncratic and systematic components because our preliminary analysis
in Figures (1) and (2) suggests that differences in equity volatility between European and
U.S. firms’ are largely due to differences in idiosyncratic volatility. In addition, previous
studies that examine the association between equity volatility and the cost of corporate debt
financing typically follow a similar approach, or focus solely on idiosyncratic equity volatility
(See Campbell and Taksler (2003), Santos (2011), and Santos and Winton (2010)). However,
because equity volatility is a proxy for firm volatility, we expect that OLS estimates of the
determinants of loan spread will be biased and inconsistent. Consequently, we attempt to
obtain consistent estimates using an instrumental variable generalized methods of moments
(IV) estimator where we instrument equity volatility with the volatility of quarterly financial
statement ratios and quarterly total assets. We also control for a broad set of explanatory
variables that are standard in the literature.
In our OLS models that control for idiosyncratic and systematic volatility, we estimate
that loan spreads received by European borrowers are 29 basis points lower than those
received by U.S. borrowers. This evidence is consistent with those of Carey and Nini (2007)
and Houston et al. (2007). However our main IV results indicate that there is no statistically
significant difference in loan spreads received by European and U.S. borrowers. In addition,
compared to our OLS results, our IV results suggest that OLS estimates of the association
between idiosyncratic equity volatility and corporate loan spreads are biased downward by
about a factor of five to six. We find significant differences in coefficient estimates between
our OLS and IV results. In particular, proxies for firm size are significant in our OLS models,
5
but not in our IV models. Firm’s credit ratings have substantial explanatory power for loan
spreads in our OLS models, but little or no explanatory power in our IV models. Finally, the
sign of the coefficient on firm’s cash holdings switches from positive in OLS specifications to
negative in IV models.
Our focus on borrower location differs from previous research by Carey and Nini (2007)
and Houston et al. (2007) which mainly focus on the difference in loan spreads between
loans originated in U.S. and European markets.1 We focus on borrower location because we
expect that firm volatility depends on firms’ domicile, rather than the market where firms’
originate their loans. However a priori we expect that borrower location is highly correlated
with market of syndication because borrowers overwhelmingly originate loans in their home
region. And, therefore, we do not expect our results to depend on whether we use market of
syndication instead of location.2 Table I, which tabulates borrowers’ location against their
loans’ market of syndication, provides support for this claim. The tabulations indicate that
with few exceptions borrowers originate loans in their home market. Carey and Nini (2007)
and Houston et al. (2007) provide additional support for this claim by providing similar
evidence that borrowers tend to issue loans in their home market.
[ PLACE TABLE I HERE ]
Our results have two main implications. First, our results suggest that there is no ma-
1In the syndicated loan market, there are distinct markets that operate in different regions of the globe.
Markets can be thought of as a location where borrowers and lenders meet to arrange loan deals. Typically
borrowers and lenders are free to choose and arrange deals in markets located outside their home domicile.
In our sample, the markets that the borrowers originate loans include Africa, Asia Pacific, Eastern Eu-
rope/Russia, and Latin America/Caribbean. The market of syndication is unknown for a negligible number
of loans.
2We have reproduced the analysis in this paper focusing on market of syndication rather than borrower
location, and we have done so with data samples that both do and do not include firms that are located
outside the U.S. and Europe. The interpretation of results are identical to those presented here and the
results are available upon request.
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terial loan pricing difference between loans received by U.S. and European borrowers. This
suggests there may not be any meaningful barriers restricting borrowers in one continent
from receiving loans in the other. And, that borrowers’ observed tendency to originate loans
in their home domicile may be because there are not significant benefits to accessing foreign
markets.
Second, our result indicate that identifying consistent estimates of the coefficients of
important control variables such as equity volatility can substantially alter inferences in
empirical analysis of the determinants of syndicated loan interest rates. For example, several
studies control for firm size under the assumption that size is associated with fewer credit
risk and asymmetric information problems. However, our proxy for firm size is no longer
significant in our IV models. Also, standard risk proxies for such as credit ratings do not
have significant explanatory power in our IV models. This is consistent with Campbell and
Taksler (2003)’s results that idiosyncratic volatility can explain as much variation in bond
yields as bond ratings. In addition, the coefficient on proxies for borrowers’ cash holdings is
positive in OLS estimations but negative in instrumental variable estimations. The positive
sign in the OLS models is inconsistent with the notion that firms with greater cash holdings
have lower risk because they have more balance sheet liquidity. In contrast, our IV results
have the expected sign. In each of these cases, the control variables have strong correlations
with idiosyncratic equity volatility.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section I presents the econometric procedure.
Section II describes the data and the creation of the proxy variables. Section III shows the
estimation results and robustness checks. Section IV concludes.
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I. Empirical Model
In this section we present our empirical model that we use to examine the determinants of
loan spreads for U.S. and European borrowers. Our model is motivated by the literature
that examines the determinants of syndicated loan spreads and contingent claims models
of debt valuation. We model interest rate charged on corporate loans as a function of the
volatility of the market value of the firm’s assets, the ratio of the book value of firm’s debt
to the market value of firm’s assets, and a set of additional control variables. We follow
the approach of Carey and Nini (2007) and Houston et al. (2007) and allow loan spreads to
depend on whether a borrower is located in Europe or the U.S. The model is given by the
following equation:
ri − rf = α0 + α1σAi + α2Di
Ai
+ α3Ei + Γ1
′Zi + ε1i (1)
In Equation (1) ri − rf , is the interest rate spread on the loan, defined as the interest rate
on the loan, ri, minus the risk free rate, rf . The risk spread depends of the volatility of the
firm’s assets, σAi, and borrower’s leverage,
Di
Ai
, which is total debt, D, divided by the market
value of assets, A. Ei is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is located in Europe,
Z is the vector of additional control variables, and ε1i is the residual.
Because firm’s asset volatility is unobservable, the parameters of the loan spread equation
cannot be identified. One approach is not to account for firm volatility, and leave it as an
omitted variable. However, since volatility is likely correlated with other control variables,
this might result in biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. A typical approach used
by the literature is to use firm’s equity volatility as a proxy for firm’s asset volatility. Studies
that similarly use equity volatility as a proxy for firm volatility include Gilchrist, Sim, and
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Zakraj˘sek (2010), Santos (2011), Santos and Winton (2010), and Shumway (2001). We
interpret this approach as implying that equity volatility can be written as a function of
firm’s asset volatility and market leverage:




In equation (2) the error term ε2i is the difference between our estimate of idiosyncratic
equity volatility and the lenders’ assessment of firm volatility. We interpret the error term in
multiple ways. First, if lenders use estimates of idiosyncratic or systematic equity volatility
as a proxy for borrower volatility then the error term could simply reflect the difference
between our estimates and lenders’. For instance, lenders could use daily returns, while we
use weekly returns in our analysis. Or, if lenders use different asset pricing models to estimate
idiosyncratic and systematic equity volatility, the error term could reflect these differences.
Second, lenders could implement a variety of non-linear models to estimate borrowers’ asset
volatility from estimates of equity volatility.3 And, the error term could reflect differences
between these assessments and our estimates of equity volatility. Third, if the lenders use
other proxies for firm volatility such as cash flow or sales volatility, the error could reflect
differences between these proxies and our estimates of equity volatility.
One can argue that equity volatility could also be a function of other control variables. In
particular equity volatility could be a function of whether a firm is located in U.S. or Europe,
independent of firm’s asset volatility and leverage. However our key identifying assumption
is that the difference in firm equity volatility between U.S and European firms are accounted
for by differences in firms’ asset volatility and firms’ leverage. Bartram et al. (2009) present
3These models are usually derived from structural models of corporate debt valuation. For an example
of these type of models see McNeil et al. (2005), Lando (2004), and Cairns (2004).
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evidence that supports this claim. Their results indicate that the difference in idiosyncratic
equity volatility between U.S. and foreign firms is likely due to greater risk taking by U.S.
firms. We discuss the importance of this identifying assumption below.













and insert it into equation (1). We assume that the error terms ε1i in equation (1) and ε2i in
equation (2) are independent and are orthogonal to the explanatory variables. This results
in the following regression model:






















= ρ0 + ρ1σEi + ρ2
Di
Ai
+ α3Ei + Γ1
′Zi + ηi (4)
In contrast to equation (1), equation (4) models interest rate spreads as a function of
equity volatility rather than asset volatility. Models of this type are unable to identify the
parameters α0, α1, and α2. If our previously mentioned assumption that European dummy
variable or the control variables in the Z matrix do not have an independent association
with equity volatility in equation (2) is valid, then we are able to identify α3 and Γ1.
If we try to estimate the coefficients in equation (4) with OLS, then we would likely get
biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates, since equity volatility is correlated with the
error term, ηi. This is because
COV (σEi, ε2i) = V AR (ε2i) 6= 0 ⇒ COV (σEi, ηi) = −ρ1V AR (ε2i) . (5)
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The relationship between the equity volatility and the error term will lead to a downward
biased estimate of ρ1, even if all other control variables are exogenous. Consistent estimates
could be obtained by finding an instrumental variable correlated with equity volatility, but
orthogonal to ηi. One solution is to use another variable that could be a proxy for for σAi,
but is uncorrelated with ηi.
We use proxies for the volatility of quarterly financial statement ratios and balance sheet
variables as instruments for equity volatility. Our instruments include standard deviation
of total assets, the standard deviation of the ratio of total equity to total assets, and the
standard deviation of cash and short term investments to assets. Our reasoning is simple.
We suggest that if there is greater variation in these three variables derived from borrowers’
quarterly financial statements, then investors’ valuation of firms’ assets should change more
frequently. Hence, firms with more volatile financial statements should have more volatile
asset values, and as a result, more volatile stock returns. We use these variables as instru-
ments for both idiosyncratic and systematic equity volatility. We relate our instrumental
variables to firms’ asset volatility and leverage with the following equation.




As already mentioned, in order for our instruments to identify the consistent estimates of the
coefficients in equation (4), the instruments should not be correlated with the error terms ε2i
and ε1i. As previously mentioned, we interpret ε2i as the difference between our estimate of
equity volatility and lenders’ assessment of firm volatility. We do not suspect that there are
convincing reasons why our instruments would be correlated with ε2i. If our instruments are
orthogonal to ε1i, this would imply that our instruments are not omitted variables. However,
we recognize one could argue that lenders, like equity investors, could base their assessment
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of firm volatility directly on estimates of the volatility of balance sheet variables. And, this
would imply that measures of the volatility of balance sheet variables should be included
in the regressions as explanatory variables for loan spreads, rather than as instruments of
equity volatility. To the extent that stock prices reflect publicly available information we
expect estimates of equity volatility should subsume the information in our instrumental
variables.
II. Data Sample and Summary Statistics
We gather data from several sources. We obtain information on corporate loan contracts
from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database, data on U.S. firms’ financial state-
ments from Compustat, data from European and non-U.S. firms’ financial statements from
Compustat Global, data on U.S. firms stock prices from CRSP, and data on European firms
stock prices from the Compustat Global Security Daily database. We also acquire data on
exchange rates and interest rates from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis web site.
We begin with with the Dealscan database and gather data on individual corporate loans
originated by borrowers located in the United States and Europe. Each observation is an
individual corporate loan facility and consists primarily of syndicated loans; however, there
are a small amount of loans made by an individual lender to a borrower. For an overview
of the syndicated loan market and the Dealscan database, see Strahan (1999). Our data
loan sample spans the years 1987 through 2010. The Dealscan database has information on
a small number of loans in the late 1980’s and the number of loans in the database begins
to increase in the mid 1990’s. There is substantial coverage of the U.S. market throughout
the time frame while coverage of the European market largely concentrated in late 1990’s
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and afterwards. We merge Dealscan with Compustat and Compustat Global data for firms’
fiscal years that end one year prior to the calendar year in which a loan is originated. We
merge Dealscan with Compustat data from 1986 to 2009 and Compustat Global data for
the years 1989 through 2009. The time frame for Compustat Global begins later because of
data availability. We then merge our database with variables constructed from CRSP data
from 1986 to 2009 and variables constructed from Compustat Global Security Daily data
from 1989 to 2009. Our resulting sample contains 25,538 loan facilities.
We begin by describing the primary variables used in our analysis. The dependent
variable in our estimations are corporate loan interest rate spreads. Our measure of corporate
loan spreads is Dealscan’s All-In-Drawn spread which is interest rate on a corporate loan
minus the LIBOR rate at the issue date. As stated by Santos and Winton (2010), Dealscan
states that the All-In-Drawn spread is a measure of the “overall cost of the loan” that “takes
into account, one time and recurring fees.”
Our first main control variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a loan is originated
by a borrower located in Europe or the United States.4 The dummy variable takes a value
of 1 if the the borrower is located in Europe. The coefficient on this dummy variable is an
estimate of difference in loan spreads paid by U.S. and European borrowers. Panel A of
Table II provides counts of the number of loans originated by borrowers located in Europe
or the U.S. in our data sample, and indicates that the majority of loans are originated
by borrowers located in the U.S. Although our European sample is smaller than our U.S.
sample, it is relatively large compared to those used by Carey and Nini (2007) and Houston
et al. (2007).5 Panel B tabulates the number of loans originated by borrowers located in
4We also re-run all estimations with a dummy variable that indicates whether a loan is originated in
the European market versus the U.S. market. However, classification is nearly identical because borrowers’
typically obtain loans in their home market. The interpretation of all results are identical.
5In addition our sample is also limited by the availability of firm level control variables.
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each European country in our data sample, and indicates that the majority of European
loans are originated by borrowers located in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain,
Netherlands, and Italy.
[ PLACE TABLE II HERE ]
Our next main control variables are estimates of borrowers’ idiosyncratic and systematic
stock return volatility. We construct our estimates of stock return volatility using data
on borrowers’ weekly stock returns. For U.S. firms we gather stock price data for CRSP
for the final trading day of each week during a borrowers fiscal year and construct weekly
returns using the formula used by CRSP to construct daily and monthly stock returns.6
For European firms, we gather stock price data from the Compustat Global Security Daily
database for the final trading day of each week. The Compustat Global Security Daily
database does not directly provide return data, so we construct weekly returns using the
formula provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).7
We then use the constructed weekly returns to estimate the following CAPM regression
model for each borrower’s fiscal year:









formula, rs, represents the stock return, the inverse of the cumulative split factor is denoted as f , and the
price of firms shares are, p. The subscripts, i, and, t, refer to borrower and fiscal year respectively.
7The formula used to construct weekly stock returns for non-U.S. borrowers is is calculated in three steps.
First, we convert all foreign stock prices into U.S. dollars. Second, we adjust prices by multiplying observed
week-end prices by the daily total return factor and then divide this by the cumulative adjustment factor.
We then calculate the weekly return as rsi,t =
pi,t−pi,t
pi,t−1
. In the preceding formula, rs, represents the stock
return, the cumulative split factor is denoted as f , and the price of firms shares are, p. The subscripts, i,
and, t, refer to borrower and fiscal year respectively.
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In equation (7), rsi,t,y, is the weekly stock return for firm, i, during week, t, in year, j.
The risk free weight, rft,j, is either the weekly 1 year treasury rate for U.S. firms or the
weekly 1 year LIBOR rate for foreign firms. Also, rmt,j, is the return on market index m,
during week, t, in year, j. Each firm’s yearly CAPM beta is given by βi,t, and ξi,t,y, is the
idiosyncratic component of firm’s weekly stock returns. An issue arises in deciding what
proxy to use for firm’s market index. For U.S. firms we follow convention and calculate a
value weighted index for each week using all available returns in CRSP. For European firms,
we use an estimate of the value weighted return on the stock exchange that each firm trades
as a proxy for the relevant market portfolio. We include the returns for all available firms in
the Compustat Global Security Daily database for each week available for each exchange in
our estimates of the value weighted return. We drop all returns for exchanges with less than





rmt j − rft,j
)
which is the standard deviation of the excess return on the relevant
market portfolio, multiplied by β̂i,t, our estimate of each firm’s CAPM beta. Our estimate of
firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility is Std (ξi,t,j) which is the yearly standard deviation
of our estimate of each firm’s weekly idiosyncratic stock returns. We annualize our measures
of systematic and idiosyncratic stock return volatility by multiplying by 100×√52.
Our next variables we discuss are our instrumental variables. We construct three in-
struments for equity volatility using quarterly financial statement data from Compustat and
Compustat Global. The instruments we choose are based on relevance, and data availability.
The first instrument is the yearly standard deviation of the ratio of borrowers’ quarterly
book equity to assets ratio. The second instrument is the yearly standard deviation of the
ratio of borrowers’ quarterly cash and short term investment to assets. The third instrument
is the yearly standard deviation borrowers’ quarterly total assets.
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We now discus our remaining control variables. For similar discussions and examples,
see work by Santos (2011), Santos and Winton (2010), and Strahan (1999). For brevity, we
do not discuss predictions regarding these variables’ coefficient estimates, as these controls
are standard in the literature and have been widely used in analysis similar to ours.
We construct multiple variables describing other non-price loan contract terms common
in the literature. We construct a measure of loan size, which is the log of the loan facility
amount in dollars. For term loans this would include the entire loan balance received by the
borrower at origination, and for revolving lines of credit, this would include the amount of
line of credit that the borrower has available for future use. We create an estimate of a loan’s
maturity length which is the log of the difference between a loan facility’s stated maturity
date and start date in days. We measure the size of the loan syndicate as the number
of lenders. We include dummy variables that indicate whether a loan is secured, contains
performance pricing provisions, or has general and financial covenants. Since information
regarding whether a loan is secured is often missing, we set missing values of the secured
indicator equal to zero and include an indicator for missing values. We also include dummy
variables indicating loan type and purpose.
We construct multiple proxies for borrower’s risk characteristics which we derive from
firm’s financial statement and stock price data. We include Tobin’s average Q which is
interpreted as the market value of firm’s assets divided by the replacement value of firm’s
capital stock. Tobin’s Average Q is calculated as the sum of total assets and market value
of equity minus the sum of book value of common equity and deferred taxes, all divided by
total assets. We include a proxy for leverage. Leverage is calculated as long term debt plus
debt in current liabilities, all divided by total assets. We calculate a proxy for firm’s cash
stocks as the sum of cash and short term investments divided by total assets. We proxy for
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borrower size with the log of firm’s total assets in millions. We have information on firm’s
debt ratings and include a proxy for Moody’s senior unsecured debt rating at time of loan
origination. We also include a dummy variable to indicate whether a firm has a debt rating
or not. Debt ratings are provided directly by Dealscan. Finally, we create dummy variables
for each year and 2-digit SIC codes.
We now briefly discuss basic summary statistics describing the variables in our data
set which are located in Table III. We present statistics separately for European and U.S.
subsamples and the total data sample. For each variable we report the mean, standard
deviation, 25th and 75th percentiles. We briefly highlight the differences between the U.S.
and European subsamples. First, loan spreads paid by the U.S. borrowers are roughly 25 basis
points higher than those paid by European borrowers. In addition, the statistics indicate that
U.S. borrowers’ idiosyncratic equity volatility is roughly 15% higher on average compared
to European firms, while systematic equity volatility is about the same for both U.S. and
European firms. This is consistent with our expectation that U.S. borrowers pay higher
loan spreads and have greater idiosyncratic equity volatility than European firms. Looking
at the summary statistics for our instrumental variables, U.S. firms have greater cash and
short term investment volatility and greater book equity volatility. However European firms
have greater total asset volatility than U.S. firms, which we suspect is due to the fact that
European firms are slightly larger than U.S. firms on average.
[ PLACE TABLE III HERE ]
Further examination reveals a few other differences between European and U.S. sub-
samples. U.S. firms have lower debt ratings but a greater portion of U.S. firms have debt
ratings. We also see that loan syndicates have more lenders in Europe than in U.S. Finally
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a larger portion of loans are collateralized, contain covenants, and have performance pricing
provisions in the U.S subsample. The remaining statistics indicate that U.S. and European
subsamples have similar average values for Tobin’s Q, leverage, loan maturity, and loan size.
III. Results
A. Main Results
We begin by describing our main results. We present out OLS estimates in Table IV, and
we present our IV estimates in Tables V through VIII.
In the first column of Table IV, we include the full set of control variables but exclude
idiosyncratic or systematic stock return volatility. The results indicate that the average loan
spread received by European borrowers is about 37 basis points lower than those received by
U.S. borrowers. In the second column we include the full set of control variables including
idiosyncratic and systematic stock return volatility, and the results imply that the average
loan spread received by European borrowers is about 29 basis points lower than those received
by U.S. borrowers. Our OLS results are comparable to Carey and Nini (2007) who find a
loan spread differential about 30 basis points and Houston et al. (2007) who find a loan
spread differential about 40 basis points.
[ PLACE TABLE IV HERE ]
The results in the second column also indicate that there is a positive association between
idiosyncratic equity volatility and loan spreads, and a negative association between system-
atic equity volatility and loan spreads. However, only the association between idiosyncratic
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equity volatility and loan spreads is statistically significant. Our estimates indicate that a
one standard deviation increase in idiosyncratic equity volatility is associated with roughly a
22 basis point increase in loan spreads. Overall our OLS results suggest that controlling for
idiosyncratic equity volatility influences the estimates of the loan spread difference paid by
European and U.S. borrowers. However the results show that equity volatility cannot fully
account for the loan spread difference.
We now discuss are main IV results presented in Table V. In the first column, we present
estimation results with a full set of control variables, and we instrument both idiosyncratic
and systematic equity volatility with our measures for quarterly balance sheet volatility. The
results indicate that there is no longer any statistically significant difference in loan spreads
paid by U.S. and European borrowers.
[ PLACE TABLE V HERE ]
These estimation results also show that the association between idiosyncratic equity
volatility and loan spreads is about 5 times larger when compared to our OLS results. In
addition, consistent with our OLS results we find that there is no statistically significant
association between loan spreads and systematic volatility. The parameter estimate suggests
that a one standard deviation increase in idiosyncratic equity volatility is associated with a
129 basis point increase in loan spreads.
In the second column we present results of a specification where we include all control
variables except for systematic equity volatility, and the results are nearly identical to the
results in the first column. The coefficient estimate implies that a one standard deviation
increase in idiosyncratic equity volatility is associated with a 114 basis point increase in loan
spreads.
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In order to preliminarily examine the robustness of our results, we re-estimate our IV
model separately for both U.S. and European borrowers. We would like to examine whether
idiosyncratic equity volatility is a determinant of loan spreads separately for both U.S and
European borrowers, and whether our full sample results are overly influenced by either
the U.S. or European sub-samples. The results for the U.S. and European sub-samples are
located in the third and forth columns of Table V respectively. The results indicate that a
one standard deviation increase in idiosyncratic equity volatility is associated with about 102
and 92 basis point increases in loan spreads for U.S. and European borrowers respectively.
These results suggest that that our full sample results are not driven primarily by either
U.S. or European sub-samples.
The first stage results for the models in Table V are presented in Table VI. In gen-
eral as predicted these results indicate that our instrumental variables have a positive and
statistically significant association with both of our measures of equity volatility. The only
exceptions are that there is a negative association between total asset volatility and system-
atic equity volatility in the second column, and that cash and short term investment volatility
does not have a statistically significant association with idiosyncratic equity volatility in the
fifth column.
[ PLACE TABLE VI HERE ]
In addition, we note that in all of our specifications the p-values for the test of under
identification rejects the null hypothesis that our model is under-identified. Also, the tests
of over-identifying restrictions fail to reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are
orthogonal to the error term.
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B. Results for Additional Control Variables
In this subsection we describe how our IV estimates differ from OLS estimates for our
remaining control variables. We emphasize that if our OLS estimates of the association
between equity volatility and syndicated loan spreads are biased and inconsistent, then all
of the remaining estimates could be biased and inconsistent.
Our OLS results in Table IV are generally consistent with those found by previous re-
search examining the determinants of syndicated loan spreads. We find that larger firm size,
lower leverage, and more favorable debt ratings are all associated with lower loan spreads.
The coefficient for borrowers’ cash-to-assets is positive and statistically significant. This
coefficient estimate appears to be at odds with intuition, as we would expect that borrowers
with more cash and liquid assets should be able to more easily service debt payments. How-
ever studies by McLean (2011) and Riddick and Whited (2009) suggest that riskier firms
hold more cash. Consequently, the positive coefficient estimate could imply that we do not
adequately control for volatility or risk in our OLS models.
Our results for loan terms are also consistent with prior research. The results indicate
that larger loans and loans with longer maturities are associated with lower loan spreads.
In addition, our results for loan contract terms indicate that loans with performance pricing
and loans with financial covenants have lower spreads, and that secured loans and loans with
general covenants have higher loan spreads. The number of lenders does not have have a
statistically significant impact on cost of syndicated loans.
For multiple control variables our IV estimates differ markedly from our OLS estimates.
Our IV estimates indicate that there is no longer any statistically significant association
between borrower size and loan spreads. This contrasts with much of the corporate finance
literature which assumes that larger size is associated with lower risk and asymmetric infor-
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mation problems.
In contrast to our OLS results, our IV results show that debt ratings no longer have
a statistically significant association with loan spreads. Previous research suggests that
borrowers with more favorable debt ratings are likely receive more favorable financing terms
because debt ratings certify borrowers’ credit worthiness and help to mitigate asymmetric
information and credit risk problems. However, our IV results suggest that debt ratings do
not have explanatory power for loan spreads after controlling for volatility.
The coefficient on borrowers’ cash and short term investment is negative and statistically
significant in our IV estimations. This contrasts with the positive and statistically significant
coefficient found in our OLS specification. Likewise compared to OLS results the coefficient
on leverage is also smaller in the IV results. These OLS coefficient estimates are likely biased
upward due to the positive correlation between idiosyncratic equity volatility and these
variables, and because the OLS coefficient estimate for idiosyncratic volatility is downward
biased. The first stage results in Table VI support this claim because they show that cash
and short term investments and leverage have a strong positive association with idiosyncratic
equity volatility, and leverage.
Certain coefficients for loan contract terms also change. The estimated coefficients for
corporate loan maturity and the secured loan indicator also differ between our OLS and
IV results. The coefficient on loan maturity is no longer statistically significant in our IV
results, and the coefficient on the secured indicator is in our IV results is about half of the




In this section we present multiple robustness checks to further assess the validity of our
estimation results. The second stage results are presented in Table VII, and the first stage
results are presented in Table VIII. First, we use each of our measures of balance sheet
volatility to estimate exactly identified IV models. We present these results in the first three
columns of Table VII. The results indicate that the coefficient estimates for idiosyncratic
equity volatility are quantitatively similar to the results presented in Table V.
[ PLACE TABLE VII HERE ]
Inspection of the IV estimations in Table V and the first three columns of Table VII show
that both the European dummy variable and borrower size are not statistically significant in
the second stage estimates, and the results in Table VI and the first three columns in Table
VIII indicate that these variables are statistically significant in the first stage estimates. If
these variables are uncorrelated with the residuals in our empirical model, then we expect
that these variables may be suitable instrumental variables for equity volatility. Therefore,
if this is the case, then using European dummy variable and borrower size as instrumental
variables should provide estimates that are similar to our previous IV results.
We present these results in forth through sixth columns of Table VII. In the forth column,
we include only total assets as an instrument; in the fifth column we include our balance
sheet volatility indicators and total assets as instruments; and in the sixth column we include
European dummy as the only instrument. The results in the forth and fifth columns are
again quantitatively similar to our previous IV results.
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[ PLACE TABLE VIII HERE ]
In the sixth column, when the European dummy variable is the only an instrument
for idiosyncratic equity volatility, the estimated coefficient on idiosyncratic equity volatility
is again comparable to previous results. This provides additional confirmation that the
observed difference in loan spreads paid by U.S. and European borrowers in our OLS model
and previous research can be accounted for by U.S. borrowers’ greater idiosyncratic equity
volatility.
Taken together, our robustness checks indicate that multiple sets of instrumental variables
generate similar coefficient estimates of the empirical association between equity volatility
and corporate loan spreads. We suggest that these results imply that our primary results
presented in Table V are not due to luck, data mining, or any particular bias generated by
a particular instrumental variable. In addition, our results imply that multiple instrumental
variables can be used to identify an association between idiosyncratic equity volatility and
corporate loan spreads that accounts for the difference in average loans spreads between loans
originated by U.S. and European borrowers. We also point out that in all of our robustness
checks, that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are correlated with the
residuals.
IV. Conclusion
This paper examines whether idiosyncratic equity volatility can account for the average dif-
ference in corporate loan spreads paid by U.S. and European borrowers observed by previous
research. We present evidence that OLS estimates of the association between loan spreads
and systematic and idiosyncratic equity volatility are likely biased and inconsistent. We use
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an instrumental variable estimator that can potentially identify consistent estimates of the
association between loan spreads and equity volatility. Our main IV results indicate that
there is no statistically significant difference in corporate loan spreads paid by U.S. and Eu-
ropean borrowers, and that OLS estimates of the association between idiosyncratic equity
volatility and loan spreads is downward biased by a factor of about 5.
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Table I: Borrower Region and Market of Syndication
This table tabulates borrowers’ location against loans’ market of syndica-
tion. “Other” market of syndication includes Africa, Asia Pacific, Eastern
Europe/Russia, Latin America/Caribbean, and Unknown.
Market of Syndication
Borrower Region United States Western Europe Other Total
United States 23,816 52 44 23,912
Western Europe 46 1,569 11 1,626
Total 23,862 1,621 55 25,538
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Table II: Distribution of Borrower Location
This table tabulates the number of loans by borrower location. Panel A
provides counts of the number of loans originated by borrowers located in
Europe or the U.S. Panel B tabulates the number of loans originated by
borrowers located in each European country in our data sample.
Panel A: Number of Loans by Borrower Location
Frequency Percentage
United States 23,816 93.63
Europe 1,626 6.37
Panel B: Number of Loans by Borrower Country for Firms Located in Europe
Frequency Percentage

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The dependent variable in OLS regressions is the all-in-drawn spread on the
loan. Loan type, loan purpose, 2-digit SIC dummies, and year dummies are
included in the regressions but are omitted from the table. All standard




European Market -36.971*** -28.921***
4.675 4.554




Total Assets -10.771*** -8.584***
1.047 1.036
Moody’s Debt Rating -6.440*** -5.336***
0.602 0.571




Loan Maturity -10.432*** -8.641***
2.259 2.242
Loan Amount -18.038*** -16.848***
0.993 0.984
Number of Lenders 0.126 0.112
0.128 0.124
Secured/Unsecured Dummy 63.817*** 57.481***
2.315 2.272
Secured/Unsecured Missing Dummy -5.441** -5.022**
2.285 2.232
Performance Pricing -35.585*** -32.934***
2.642 2.554
General Covenants 19.583*** 20.349***
3.337 3.268
Financial Covenants -10.897*** -11.793***
3.227 3.153
Idiosyncratic Stock Return Vol. 1.033***
0.060
Systematic Stock Return Vol. -0.003
0.091
N 25538 25538
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table V: Main Instrumental Variable Results
The dependent variable in IV regressions is the all-in-drawn spread on the loan. Loan
type, loan purpose, 2-digit SIC dummies, and year dummies are included in the re-
gressions but are omitted from the table. All standard errors are clustered at the
firm level and are reported below the coefficient estimates. The instruments used
for each column are specified in the Instruments Used panel. Under-Id test has the
null hypothesis that the equation is under identified, so rejection of this test implies
that the excluded instruments are relevant, meaning correlated with the endogenous
regressors. Null Hypothesis for Hansen J test is that the instruments are valid in-
struments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments
are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. First and second columns use
the whole sample, third column is the sample for U.S., and forth column is for the
European sample.
Full Sample U.S. European
Both Only Sample Sample
Volatilities Idio. Vol.
Idiosyncratic Stock Return Vol. 5.828*** 5.212*** 4.589*** 8.073***
1.135 0.654 0.592 2.658
Systematic Stock Return Vol. -1.224
1.835
European Market 7.702 3.407
9.774 7.173
Average Q -14.065*** -14.965*** -15.602*** -3.102
1.947 1.326 1.304 4.261
Leverage 32.180*** 37.680*** 38.993*** 59.022**
12.269 8.908 8.693 28.978
Total Assets 3.123 0.247 -1.088 4.354
4.658 1.839 1.743 5.200
Moody’s Debt Rating -0.832 -0.844 -1.258 -1.853
1.043 1.001 0.952 4.294
Missing Debt Rating -9.049 -9.709 -14.157 -26.527
12.504 11.984 11.291 58.699
Cash-to-Assets -42.359** -45.131** -34.210* -40.670
20.493 19.422 18.509 66.848
Loan Maturity -0.674 -1.403 -5.993** 47.788***
3.149 2.889 2.694 14.313
Loan Amount -11.506*** -11.976*** -13.004*** -1.004
1.616 1.409 1.400 3.532
Number of Lenders 0.008 0.055 0.176 -0.690
0.181 0.159 0.158 0.521
Secured/Unsecured Dum. 30.301*** 31.947*** 36.312*** 4.052
5.762 5.054 4.537 21.424
Secured/Unsecured Miss. Dum. -3.431 -3.305 -4.943* 4.449
2.940 2.812 2.653 18.011
Performance Pricing -21.377*** -22.257*** -24.626*** 8.517
3.675 3.324 3.249 9.491
General Covenants 23.711*** 23.375*** 23.456*** 28.466
4.084 3.916 3.744 38.048
Financial Covenants -15.418*** -15.333*** -16.129*** -32.932
3.940 3.808 3.647 33.032
Instruments Used
Cash and Short Term Inv. Vol. YES YES YES YES
Book Equity Vol. YES YES YES YES
Total Asset Vol. YES YES YES YES
N 25538 25538 23912 1626
Under-Id 16.730 106.533 97.677 18.293
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J 0.010 0.465 1.400 4.385
p-val 0.919 0.793 0.497 0.112
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 31
Table VI: First Stage Results for Main Instrumental Variable Estimation
The dependent variable in the first stage regressions is either the idiosyncratic stock return volatility
or the systematic stock return volatility, and is specified under the column number. Loan type, loan
purpose, 2-digit SIC dummies, and year dummies are included in the regressions but are omitted from
the table. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficient
estimates. The instruments used for each column are specified in the Instruments Used panel. First
through third columns use the whole sample, forth column is the sample for U.S., and forth column
is for the European sample.
Full Sample Full Sample U.S. European
Both Volatilities Sample Sample
Idio. Vol. Syst. Vol. Only Idio. Vol.
Instruments Used
Cash and Short Term Inv. Vol. 21.012*** 16.849*** 21.012*** 23.423*** -13.906
6.575 4.069 6.575 6.962 11.489
Book Equity Volatility 28.202*** 17.557*** 28.202*** 27.777*** 36.588***
4.069 2.648 4.069 4.222 8.317
Total Assets Volatility 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
European Market -7.969*** -0.708 -7.969***
0.661 0.457 0.661
Average Q 0.398* 0.879*** 0.398* 0.577** -0.990**
0.214 0.120 0.214 0.228 0.426
Leverage 7.874*** -0.534 7.874*** 8.665*** -0.588
1.200 0.634 1.200 1.267 2.731
Total Assets -2.076*** 1.483*** -2.076*** -2.144*** -1.346***
0.188 0.103 0.188 0.210 0.274
Moody’s Debt Rating -1.072*** -0.497*** -1.072*** -1.085*** -1.321***
0.116 0.059 0.116 0.122 0.331
Missing Debt Rating -11.832*** -4.999*** -11.832*** -11.763*** -18.001***
1.450 0.741 1.450 1.510 4.222
Cash-to-Assets 12.758*** 7.690*** 12.758*** 12.215*** 10.107*
2.483 1.513 2.483 2.604 5.842
Loan Maturity -1.638*** -0.224 -1.638*** -1.542*** -1.243**
0.307 0.181 0.307 0.326 0.580
Loan Amount -1.108*** -0.213** -1.108*** -1.150*** -0.717**
0.165 0.097 0.165 0.180 0.284
Number of Lenders 0.009 -0.034** 0.009 0.016 -0.006
0.026 0.015 0.026 0.029 0.046
Secured/Unsecured Dum. 5.742*** 1.655*** 5.742*** 5.544*** 3.722***
0.429 0.251 0.429 0.445 1.296
Secured/Unsecured Miss. Dum. -0.384 -0.304 -0.384 -0.124 -2.760**
0.424 0.260 0.424 0.441 1.164
Performance Pricing -2.425*** -0.517** -2.425*** -2.516*** -0.693
0.421 0.238 0.421 0.442 0.819
General Covenants -0.774 -0.258 -0.774 -0.613 3.042
0.544 0.340 0.544 0.555 1.923
Financial Covenants 0.977* 0.527* 0.977* 0.840 0.425
0.530 0.314 0.530 0.538 1.758
N 25538 25538 25538 23912 1626
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
32
Table VII: Instrumental Variable Results for Robustness Checks
The dependent variable in IV regressions is the all-in-drawn spread on the loan. Loan type, loan purpose, 2-digit
SIC dummies, and year dummies are included in the regressions but are omitted from the table. All standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficient estimates. The instruments used for
each column are specified in the Instruments Used panel. Under-Id test has the null hypothesis that the equation
is under identified, so rejection of this test implies that the excluded instruments are relevant, meaning correlated
with the endogenous regressors. Null Hypothesis for Hansen J test is that the instruments are valid instruments,
i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated
equation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Idiosyncratic Stock Return Vol. 4.920*** 5.097*** 6.070*** 5.099*** 5.146*** 4.745***
1.022 0.724 1.559 0.574 0.431 0.626
European Market 1.362 2.745 10.328 2.763 2.870
9.627 7.368 13.687 6.554 5.937
Average Q -14.753*** -14.879*** -15.571*** -14.881*** -14.937*** -14.629***
1.402 1.339 1.759 1.364 1.304 1.298
Leverage 40.137*** 38.656*** 30.534** 38.636*** 38.259*** 41.595***
11.092 9.186 15.133 8.304 7.779 8.758
Total Assets -0.380 -0.005 2.051 -0.749
2.525 1.929 3.523 1.733
Moody’s Debt Rating -1.174 -0.984 0.058 -0.981 -0.907 -1.361
1.310 1.055 1.830 0.993 0.882 0.952
Missing Debt Rating -13.346 -11.268 0.126 -11.241 -10.458 -15.392
15.174 12.498 20.665 11.513 10.575 11.608
Cash-to-Assets -40.085* -43.305** -60.960* -43.347** -44.044** -36.914*
23.960 20.018 33.270 19.176 17.604 18.875
Loan Maturity -1.902 -1.594 0.093 -1.590 -1.544 -2.205
3.218 2.907 3.919 2.726 2.689 2.702
Loan Amount -12.369*** -12.164*** -11.042*** -12.161*** -11.990*** -12.570***
1.656 1.476 2.152 1.664 1.401 1.402
Number of Lenders 0.061 0.059 0.046 0.059 0.059 0.063
0.157 0.159 0.176 0.157 0.155 0.152
Secured/Unsecured Dum. 33.628*** 32.538*** 26.566*** 32.524*** 32.303*** 34.700***
6.859 5.386 10.259 5.067 4.292 4.890
Secured/Unsecured Miss. Dum. -3.443 -3.371 -2.976 -3.370 -3.328 -3.514
2.792 2.796 3.122 2.800 2.797 2.689
Performance Pricing -22.956*** -22.501*** -20.003*** -22.495*** -22.410*** -23.405***
3.869 3.382 5.118 3.296 3.114 3.244
General Covenants 23.234*** 23.365*** 24.088*** 23.367*** 23.331*** 23.104***
3.912 3.896 4.389 3.900 3.891 3.745
Financial Covenants -15.172*** -15.327*** -16.172*** -15.329*** -15.320*** -15.020***
3.818 3.788 4.350 3.847 3.795 3.761
Instruments Used
Cash and Short Term Inv. Vol. YES YES
Book Equity Vol. YES YES
Total Asset Vol. YES YES
Total Assets YES YES
European Dummy YES
N 25538 25538 25538 25538 25538 25538
Under-Id 44.028 77.858 23.813 110.192 205.481 115.689
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J 0.483
p-val 0.923
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table VIII: First Stage Results for Robustness Checks
The dependent variable in the first stage regressions is the idiosyncratic stock return volatility. Loan type, loan
purpose, 2-digit SIC dummies, and year dummies are included in the regressions but are omitted from the table. All
standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficient estimates. The instruments used
for each column are specified in the Instruments Used panel.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash and Short Term Inv. Vol. 40.574*** 21.012***
6.104 6.575
Book Equity Volatility 33.601*** 28.202***
3.825 4.069
Total Assets Volatility 0.000*** 0.000***
0.000 0.000
European Market -7.912*** -7.865*** -7.862*** -7.792*** -7.969*** -7.792***
0.668 0.663 0.665 0.670 0.661 0.670
Average Q 0.553*** 0.436** 0.711*** 0.711*** 0.398* 0.711***
0.210 0.213 0.207 0.207 0.214 0.207
Leverage 8.976*** 7.376*** 8.366*** 8.345*** 7.874*** 8.345***
1.192 1.184 1.181 1.181 1.200 1.181
Total Assets -2.079*** -1.905*** -2.312*** -2.112*** -2.076*** -2.112***
0.178 0.180 0.188 0.180 0.188 0.180
Moody’s Debt Rating -1.059*** -1.058*** -1.093*** -1.071*** -1.072*** -1.071***
0.117 0.117 0.116 0.117 0.116 0.117
Missing Debt Rating -11.621*** -11.616*** -12.023*** -11.707*** -11.832*** -11.707***
1.452 1.451 1.451 1.454 1.450 1.454
Cash-to-Assets 11.513*** 15.843*** 18.113*** 18.141*** 12.758*** 18.141***
2.459 2.303 2.328 2.326 2.483 2.326
Loan Maturity -1.682*** -1.646*** -1.741*** -1.734*** -1.638*** -1.734***
0.308 0.307 0.309 0.309 0.307 0.309
Loan Amount -1.143*** -1.208*** -1.042*** -1.152*** -1.108*** -1.152***
0.164 0.164 0.167 0.166 0.165 0.166
Number of Lenders 0.014 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.013
0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026
Secured/Unsecured Dummy 5.939*** 5.886*** 6.032*** 6.137*** 5.742*** 6.137***
0.431 0.430 0.433 0.432 0.429 0.432
Secured/Unsecured Missing Dummy -0.444 -0.368 -0.394 -0.406 -0.384 -0.406
0.426 0.424 0.426 0.426 0.424 0.426
Performance Pricing -2.506*** -2.426*** -2.577*** -2.567*** -2.425*** -2.567***
0.421 0.422 0.422 0.422 0.421 0.422
General Covenants -0.717 -0.863 -0.669 -0.742 -0.774 -0.742
0.543 0.544 0.546 0.546 0.544 0.546
Financial Covenants 0.891* 0.983* 0.870 0.869 0.977* 0.869
0.534 0.533 0.538 0.539 0.530 0.539
Instruments Used
Cash and Short Term Inv. Vol. YES YES
Book Equity Vol. YES YES
Total Asset Vol. YES YES
Total Assets YES YES
European Dummy YES
N 25538 25538 25538 25538 25538 25538
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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